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CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES TO NATURE 
BY ROBIN ATTFIELD 
The roots of our ecological problems are often set down these days 
to the Judaeo-Christian tradition, and Christian attitudes to nature are 
often held to perpetuate these problems. There is some evidence for 
these views, but there is also much more evidence than is usually 
acknowledged for other, more beneficent Christian attitudes to the 
environment and to nonhuman nature; from this complex picture the 
adverse interpretation of Christian attitudes is at times derived by 
such methods as the selective use of evidence and the exaggeration of 
the significance of some of the evidence selected. At the same time the 
evidence for gentler attitudes is underplayed. There is some justifica- 
tion for highlighting what needs to be rejected if our attitudes are to 
be wholesome ones; but if the attitudes commended are in fact central 
within the Christian tradition, then disparaging it will not only distort 
the historical record but also unnecessarily forfeit resources by which 
these attitudes could be supported. Before turning to the evidence, I 
shall first summarize the positions of three critics of Christian atti- 
tudes, John Passmore, William Coleman, and, first of all, the writer 
whose account they each criticize and modify (and in some degree 
follow), Lynn White, Jr.1 
I. According to Lynn White's widely republished essay "The 
Roots of Our Ecological Crisis," these roots lie in the Judaeo- 
Christian belief that man, being made in God's image, is set apart 
1 John Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature (London, 1974), 3-40, 111-18 
(hereinafter MR); 'Attitudes to Nature', in R.S. Peters (ed.), Nature and Conduct, 
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, Volume 8 (London and Basingstoke 1975), 
251-64, (hereinafter AN), republished in abbreviated form in MR, second edition, 
(1980), 207-18; 'The Treatment of Animals', Journal of the History of Ideas, 36 (1975), 
195-218 (hereinafter TA: the Journal is henceforth referred to as JHI); 'Ecological 
Problems and Persuasion', in Gray Dorsey (ed.), Equality and Freedom (New York 
and Leiden, 1977), Volume II, 401-24; William Coleman, 'Providence, Capitalism, 
and Environmental Degradation, English Apologetics in an Era of Economic Revolu- 
tion', JHI, 37 (1976), 27-44; Lynn White, Jr., 'The Historical Roots of Our Ecological 
Crisis', Science, 155.37, (1967), 1203-07. White's essay, together with a reply to his 
critics, appears in Ian G. Barbour (ed.), Western Man and Environmental Ethics, 
Attitudes Toward Nature and Technology (Reading, Mass., Menlo Park, Calif., Lon- 
don, Don Mills, Ontario, 1973); it has also appeared in The Environmental Handbook, 
Action guide for the UK (London, 1971), 3-16, to which references below to White 
are made, unless otherwise qualified. 
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370 ROBIN ATTFIELD 
from nature, and that the entire physical creation was brought into 
being for human benefit and rule. The immediate roots of the crisis are 
to be found in the nineteenth-century coalition of science and technol- 
ogy, but both science and technology reflect the most influential inter- 
pretation of the tradition inherited by the Western world from 
Genesis, and adopted long before the age of Copernicus, Galileo, and 
Newton. Centuries earlier than this the medieval West far outstripped 
contemporary civilizations in technology, ruthlessly exploiting 
natural forces for human ends; and this distinctively occidental pos- 
ture was no historical accident, but reflected the characteristic beliefs 
adopted in the West through the victory of Christianity over pa- 
ganism. Pagan animism involved respect for the guardian spirits of 
trees, streams, and hills; Christianity allowed its adherents to dis- 
regard the feelings of natural objects, and with Christianity "the old 
inhibitions to the exploitation of nature crumbled."2 Accordingly, we 
cannot solve our problems by more science and technology; we must 
get to the root of them and either replace the lingering attitudes of 
Christianity with those of Zen Buddhism, or, if that proves not to be 
viable, adopt the heretical views of St. Francis, believer in pan- 
psychism and the democracy of all God's creatures. 
As will be seen, White overdramatizes the change of the human 
role vis-a-vis nature introduced by Christianity. Thus in his illumi- 
nating study of medieval technology he comments as follows on the 
invention, in seventh-century northern Europe, of the eight-oxen 
plough complete with horizontal share and mouldboard, and the pos- 
sible concomitant changes in distribution of land and crops: "No more 
fundamental change in the idea of man's relation to the soil can be 
imagined: once man had been part of nature; now he became her 
exploiter."3 This isolated and staccato comment seems to assimilate 
heavy ploughing to the targets of contemporary ecological concern 
such as nuclear fallout, defoliation or the destruction of the Amazo- 
nian rain-forest; before his readers see it like this, he must persuade 
them first that it was at any rate reprehensible. Can this be what a new 
religion is required to curtail? Indeed White's tendency to exaggerate 
has also been criticized by fellow-historians in the matter of his 
assessment of the social impact of technological innovations.4 
Now Passmore rejects White's view that the Old Testament must 
be interpreted as exploitative, though he holds that it does not pro- 
scribe despotic attitudes, and that its laws requiring various forms of 
consideration for animals are either responses to heathen rituals or 
motivated by concern for property. But Paul discarded such concern 
2White, 12. 
Lynn White, Jr., Medieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford, 1952), 56. 
4 See R.H. Hilton and P.H. Sawyer, Past and Present, 24 (1963), 90-100. 
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for animals as the Old Testament had shown, and soon the biblical 
belief in the human dominion over nature became allied to the Stoic 
belief that the irrational existed for the sake of the rational, and that 
people could do with nonhuman nature as they pleased without moral 
constraint. This attitude of "Greco-Christian arrogance" became the 
official position of Christianity down to recent times, though it was 
not systematically acted on until the modem scientific movement 
initiated by Bacon and Descartes. Passmore acknowledges that belief 
in human dominion can be taken not as despotic but as implying that 
humanity, as the steward or bailiff of God's creation, has responsibil- 
ity for its care. But, though he finds this view of man's role in Plato's 
Phaedrus and in Iamblichus, he holds that it was not held among 
Christians before Sir Matthew Hale in the seventeenth century, and 
was held only occasionally until it became a widespread view in the 
last few years. Another minority tradition, on which man is to co- 
operate with nature to perfect it by realizing its potentialities, is traced 
to the ancient Hermetic writings and then among the German Roman- 
tics such as Fichte, as if it were foreign to most of the centuries in 
between. 
Nevertheless the existence of these minority traditions shows that 
there already exist within Western traditions the "seeds" of a more 
responsible attitude to nature than the Greco-Christian one. Just as it 
has become accepted during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
that cruelty to animals and indifference to animal suffering is wrong, 
so there is scope for the development of a revised attitude to the 
natural world as a whole, in which the survival of no species is re- 
garded as metaphysically guaranteed, the interdependence of species 
is accepted, and care is taken to avoid the despoliation of nature 
through the unforeseen side effects of human action. At the same time 
the Biblical denial that nature is sacred is endorsed, belief in the rights 
of animals is rejected, the value of science and technology is re- 
affirmed, and the preservation of human civilization is presented as 
morally central. By contrast with the passivity of oriental religion, the 
active interventions favored by the "stewardship" tradition aimed at 
preserving natural beauty or alleviating ecological problems are com- 
mended, though probably not all adherents of that tradition would be 
satisfied by the limited extent of Passmore's concern for people of 
more than a century hence or for preservation of wildlife and wilder- 
ness. Passmore's more recent writings, in fact, seem to call for many 
more revisions in the areas of ethics and metaphysics than does his 
book,5 but the above account reflects his overall published position, 
5 See the revisions commended in "Ecological Problems and Persuasion," and the 
case made by R. and V. Routley, "Nuclear Energy and Obligations to the Future," 
Inquiry, 21 (1978), 133-79; 175f., n. 12, and the Preface to the second edition of MR. 
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372 ROBIN ATTFIELD 
despite his changes of emphasis. It is also perhaps appropriate to 
mention at this stage his high regard for the stimulation to be derived 
from the "vast storehouse of learning" in one particular book singled 
out for attention in his Preface: C.J. Glacken's Traces on the Rhodian 
Shore.6 
Coleman for his part concurs to some degree with the critique of 
White's position supplied by Lewis W. Moncrief.7 Moncrief points 
out that environmental stress is not peculiar to Christian cultures, and 
holds that even if religious beliefs have contributed to the problems, 
their influence will have been indirect, and is no better evidenced than 
the ties between Christianity and capitalism. Moncrief largely rejects 
White's thesis as it concerns the medieval period, and Coleman, de- 
spite a greater sympathy with White, grants much of Moncrief s case 
here and also on the need to recognize a multiplicity of factors contrib- 
uting to the despoliation of nature. But Coleman also claims that a 
form of Christian apologetics (developing from the end of the seven- 
teenth century onwards) in which one of the evidences of providence 
was the endowment of some men with predispositions to manufacture 
and trade, constituted a blessing on capitalist enterprise; and that 
the writings of the theologian principally concerned, William Derham, 
provided just the kind of empirical basis which Moncrief had found 
wanting for the link between Christianity and the more direct causes 
of ecological stress. 
Thus the contribution of Christianity to our worldwide ecological 
problems was a significant one, but Coleman has located it some 
millennia later than White had. I shall return to these and kindred 
matters concerning Christian attitudes to nature in the early moder 
period after reviewing the biblical evidence and the evidence from the 
patristic and medieval periods as it is relevant to the positions of 
White and Passmore. 
II. As Passmore has acknowledged in "Attitudes to Nature,"8 it 
is not the position of the Old Testament that everything exists to serve 
6 C.J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore, Nature and Culture in Western 
Thought from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century, Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, London, 1967. Passmore's acknowledgement occurs in the Preface to the 
First Edition of MR, p. vii. 
7 Lewis W. Moncrief, "The cultural basis for our environmental crisis," Science, 
170 (1970), 508-12, reprinted in Western Man and Environmental Ethics. 
8 MR (second edition), 209; AN, 253. The assessments of the Bible and of Chris- 
tian history on the part of Peter Singer in chapter V of Animal Liberation, A New 
Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (London, 1976) are more adverse than those of 
Passmore. A specific reply is forthcoming in my "Western Traditions and Environ- 
mental Ethics," due to be published in Australia in a collection edited by Robert 
Elliot and Aaron Gair, Environmental Philosophy: A Collection of Readings (Bris- 
bane, 1983). Some of the elements of my reply are implicit in the current essay. 
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humanity, and White is mistaken to suggest otherwise. Thus the val- 
leys are said to be watered for the sake of wild beasts (Psalm 104: 
10f.), and the same Psalm expresses God's care for a great variety of 
wild creatures. Similarly the uninhabited wilderness is given rain to 
support the plants (Job 38: 26f.) Passages such as Psalm 148 and Psalm 
104: 24, which express admiration of God's handiwork and the praise 
in which all his creatures join, cast doubt on Passmore's claim that, 
to Christianity, nature "exists primarily as a resource rather than as 
something to be contemplated with enjoyment."9 White and Pass- 
more are correct to point out that in the Bible nature is not sacred, and 
that this attitude later allowed Christians to experiment on it in order 
to investigate its secrets; yet F.B. Welbourn'1 is also correct in deny- 
ing that nature is, to the biblical writers, "unsacrosanct raw ma- 
terial." Not only does God find "everything that he had made ... 
very good" (Genesis 1: 31), but according to Deutero-Isaiah (Isaiah 
41: 17-20) God desires alongside the restoration of Israel that of 
nature's beauty and fertility. 
The biblical belief in man's dominion over nature must not be 
interpreted as if these passages did not exist. In Genesis 1 only a 
vegetarian diet was authorized (vv. 29f.), and even when meat-eating 
was sanctioned (Genesis 9: 2f.), man's dominion, as Glacken points 
out (157), was probably seen as applying simply to meat-eating and to 
the domestication of animals. At any rate Welbourn is justified in 
observing, against White, that a large variety of religions besides 
animism have set limits to the permissible treatment of trees and 
animals (562), and that the religion of the Old Testament is among 
them (564). Indeed, in the light of a whole range of particular prohibi- 
tions (Leviticus 19: 23ff., 25:1-12, Deuteronomy 14:4, 20:19, 22: 6f., 
25:4) it is difficult to credit either White's claims that Christianity 
"insisted that it is God's will that man exploit nature for his proper 
ends" (11) and that with this victory "the old inhibitions to the ex- 
ploitation of nature crumbled" (12), or Passmore's view "that man's 
relationships with [nature] are not governed by moral principles"11. 
Taken alone, these prohibitions could be construed as concerned with 
property or the elimination of paganism. But taken alongside the 
passages cited above, and together with the teaching that "The wise 
man has regard for the life of his beast" (Proverbs 12: 10)-where, 
according to Welbourn (564), the Hebrew word translated as "has 
regard for" means "knowing," e.g., knowing one's wife or knowing 
God-they exclude the interpretation that man may treat nature as he 
pleases. 
9 MR, 20. 
10 F.B. Welbourn, "Man's Dominion," Theology, 78 (1975), 561-68, at 564. 11 MR, 20. For John Black see n. 52 (below). 
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Nor can the belief in man's dominion (Genesis 1: 26-28, 9: 1-17, 
Psalm 8: 5-8) be construed in this sense. Mankind is certainly author- 
ized to rule, but only in a way consistent with the Hebrew notion of 
kingship. Kings among the Hebrews were regarded as responsible to 
God for the realm.12 The attitude appropriate for a king was that of 
David at I Chronicles 29: 11, 14: 
Thine, O Lord, is the greatness, and the power and the glory, and the 
majesty; for all that is in the heavens and in the earth is thine .... But who 
am I, and what is my people, that we should be able thus to offer willingly? 
For all things come of thee, and of thine own have we given thee. 
Whether or not rulers lived in accordance with this attitude, it is 
enough that the Hebrew understanding of dominion involved answer- 
ability and responsibility in matters of kingship and of property 
alike.13 
The conclusion that mankind's dominion over nature was con- 
strued as the responsible exercise of a circumscribed mandate is 
further supported by John Black's interpretation of Genesis 2: 15, part 
of the Jahwist account of the creation. "And the Lord God took the 
man, and put him into the garden of Eden to dress it and to keep it." 
Man was thus to preserve the garden's beauty and protect it from 
harm, as well as derive his food from it. Passmore14 writes as if this 
mandate was abolished by the Fall and the curse which followed; but 
the prelapsarian mandate of dominion was renewed after the Fall, as 
Passmore allows (6), and the changed conditions resulting from the 
Fall can hardly have led the readers of Genesis to hold that mankind 
was exonerated of previous responsibilities. Similarly Glacken com- 
ments on Psalm 8 that once the conception of man's dominion is fully 
elaborated "there is ... far less room for arrogance and pride than 
the bare reading of the words would suggest" (166). Indeed he inclines 
towards the view that man was in the Bible "a steward of God" (168). 
Passmore, as we have seen, traces belief among Christians in man- 
kind's stewardship of nature no earlier than the seventeenth century; 
but at least in this case the interpretation of his mentor is to be 
preferred. 
Likewise the New Testament bespeaks God's care for animals 
such as sparrows (Matthew 10: 29, Luke 12: 6) and plants such as lilies 
(Matthew 7: 28-30), just as much as the Old. There is no more reason 
to regard Jesus' advocacy of rescuing asses and oxen which have 
fallen into pits on the sabbath (Luke 14: 5) as motivated solely by 
concern for property15 than the Old Testament provisions relating to 
12 See Claus Westermann, Creation (London, 1974), 52. 
13 Thomas Sieger Derr, Ecology and Human Liberation (Geneva, 1973). 
14 MR, 31. For John Black, see n. 52 (below). 
15Thus Passmore, TA, 196. 
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the well-being of domestic animals. Indeed in one parable Jesus re- 
gards with obvious sympathy the painstaking retrieval by a shepherd 
of the hundredth sheep, an act with slight benefit (if any) to the 
shepherd (Luke 15: 4-7). Against this view of his attitude to plants and 
animals may be urged his curse on the barren fig-tree (Mark 11: 13f., 
20-24) and his treatment of the Gadarene swine (Mark 5: 1-20). In the 
former case, however, we have a parable at Luke 13: 6-9 which could 
easily have changed into the Markan narrative. Such a transition 
would not be unparalleled; and Stephen Clark suspects another in the 
matter of the pigs,16 the symbolic significance of which, as unclean 
animals driven out from a Gentile territory prior to its conversion, 
may be sufficient to account for their presence in the narrative. It is 
thus far from clear that the historical Jesus would have countenanced 
driving the swine to their deaths, though readers such as Augustine no 
doubt sincerely believed that this out-of-character course of action 
was actually his. 
Paul is certainly a problem case in that regarding the Old Testa- 
ment prohibition of muzzling the ox which treads the corn he asks, 
"Does God care for oxen?" expecting the answer "no"; but as Clark 
points out, "When Paul was actually thinking about the fate of the 
non-human, as distinct from merely glancing at the topic in the course 
of a different argument, his judgement is" as in Romans 8:2 If., where 
the whole creation is said to groan in travail in expectation of release 
from decay and participation in the liberty of the children of God. In 
"The Treatment of Animals" Passmore accepts that here not only 
humans are waiting on God (198); and, though he is probably right that 
the passage has influenced few since the Greek fathers to believe in 
the resurrection of animals, he cannot regard Paul's attitude to them 
here as a merely instrumental one. Non-human nature is similarly 
involved in the salvation of mankind in Colossians (1: 15-20); while at 
Revelation 5: 13 "every created thing" praises God and the Lamb, 
and Eden is symbolically restored (Revelation 22: 2; cf. Genesis 2: 9). 
With such eschatological expectations no despotic interpretation of 
the New Testament view of nature, even as far as the present is 
concerned, can be reconciled. The basic attitudes of the New Testa- 
ment writers must indeed be seen as continuous with those of the Old 
Testament, which in any case they regarded as authoritative except 
where it was explicitly superseded. 
III. Some of the diversity of Christian attitudes to nature in the 
patristic and medieval periods is recognized by White when he con- 
trasts the symbolism and the contemplative tone of the piety of the 
Greek East with the more 'voluntarist' Western theology, which he 
believes to have promoted science from the early thirteenth century 
16 Stephen R.L. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals (Oxford, 1977), 196. 
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onwards. There is danger of overgeneralization here; thus Passmore 
locates in the West the 'exemplarist' posture, in which nature is a 
system of symbols to be decoded for man's enlightenment,'7 and 
Stanley L. Jaki finds an approach conducive to science in John Philo- 
ponus, the Eastern commentator on Aristotle.18 In fact Christian atti- 
tudes were much more varied than either White or Passmore suggests, 
though I should acknowledge, as I have argued elsewhere,' that the 
doctrine of creation was conducive to the eventual emergence of 
modem science. 
The gentle and compassionate attitude of the Greek fathers to- 
wards nonhuman creatures is recognized by Passmore.20 Basil prayed 
for animals; and Chrysostom urged kindness to them because we and 
they share a common origin. According to Glacken (205) he also held 
that we can learn from them; and according to A.M. Allchin, Eastern 
Orthodoxy has never lost sight of man's cosmic vocation.2' More- 
over, according to John Rodman22 the Institutes of Justinian incorpo- 
rated the distinction between the ius gentium and the ius naturae; the 
latter endorsed motives like self-defense and the maternal instinct in 
both humans and animals, and significantly was interpreted like this 
until the seventeenth century. Origen, however, as Passmore points 
out, was heavily influenced by the Stoic view that the irrational exists 
for the sake of the rational,23 a view which may later have influenced 
Augustine to declare, in the course of an anti-Manichaean polemic, 
that the judgment of Jesus was that there are no moral ties between 
humans and animals.24 
Passmore seems to find lacking among Christians up to the seven- 
teenth century "the view that man's duty is to preserve the face of the 
earth in 'beauty, usefulness and fruitfulness'."25 Nor does he recog- 
nize as biblical or as Christian the compatible view that people may 
improve, or attempt to perfect the natural universe so long as they 
cooperate with its potentials (33, 185). Yet Glacken (192) locates just 
such a view in Basil's influential Hexaemeron: " . .. for the proper 
and natural adornment of the earth is its completion: corn waving in 
the valleys-meadows green with grass and rich with many coloured 
17 MR, 15. 
18 Stanley L. Jaki, Science and Creation (Edinburgh, 1974). 
19 God and the Secular: A Philosophical Assessment of Secular Reasoning from 
Bacon to Kant (Cardiff, 1978), Chap. 1. 
20TA, 198. 
21A.M. Allchin, Wholeness and Transfiguration Illustrated in the Lives of St. 
Francis of Assisi and St. Seraphim of Sarov (Oxford, 1974), 5. 
22 John Rodman, "Animal Justice; the Counter-revolution in Natural Right and 
Law," Inquiry, 22 (1979), 3-22, at 3, 10, and 20, n. 2. 
23 MR, 16f. 
24 Passmore quotes the relevant passage at TA, 197. 
25MR, 31; cf. 185. 
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flowers-fertile glades and hill-tops shaded by forests." Here human 
changes crown the landscape and complete God's work, almost as 
explicitly as the passage of the Hermetic Asclepius, in citing which 
Passmore acknowledges his debt to Glacken.26 Basil's theme of man 
as the furnisher and perfecter of creation was echoed even more 
explicitly by Ambrose in the West and Theodoret in Syria.27 
As to the view of man as steward, Glacken finds this view most 
explicit of all (300f.) in The Christian Topography of Cosmas Indico- 
pleustes, according to whom God has prepared creation like a house 
and appoints man to complete and adorn it. The idea of the desirability 
of improving the land seems to have become a commonplace, being 
cited alongside many less elevated ones in connection both with forest 
clearance and with forest conservation throughout the Middle Ages 
(313-45). Far from contesting Glacken's interpretation of the sources 
mentioned in this and the preceding paragraph, Passmore does not 
mention them, with the exception of Asclepius. This is a strange 
omission, as they seem to establish, contrary to Passmore's as- 
sertions, that the traditions of stewardship and of cooperation with 
nature are mainstream Christian ones, and also to strengthen Pass- 
more's claim that these "minority" traditions are well-rooted in the 
West. 
Passmore's interpretation of Augustine's anti-Manichaean 
passage28 seems to be right. But he is probably wrong in ascribing to 
Augustine the view that the irrational exists solely for the sake of the 
rational (15), or the view that the conservation or improvement of the 
natural world counts for nothing in God's eyes (32), unless he is just 
making the general point that to Augustine no works guarantee salva- 
tion. For Augustine commends "the thought that has been spent upon 
nature" in a passage from Book XXII of The City of God quoted by 
Glacken (299f.), a passage which praises improvements in agriculture, 
navigation and, let it be admitted, weaponry, and in its enthusiasm for 
"exuberant invention" somewhat belies Passmore's criticism of 
Augustine's asceticism.29 As to the view that everything is made to 
satisfy mankind's need or pleasure, Augustine explicitly rejects it. 
There is, he holds, an order of nature in which the intelligent 
are superior, e.g., to cattle, the sentient to trees, and living things to 
the lifeless; but each of these things has "value ... in itself in the 
scale of creation."30 Moreover, " ... it is not with respect to our 
26 MR, 33, and 198, n. 12 to Chap. 2. 
27Glacken, 299, 300. 
28 At MR, 11 lf. 
29 MR, 188. See also the passage about the wonder and beauty of familiar crea- 
tures, cited by Glacken, 199f., and those cited by Robert Nisbet at History of the Idea 
of Progress (London, 1980), 54-56. 
30 The City of God, XII.16, cited by Glacken, 198. 
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own convenience or discomfort, but with respect to their own nature, 
that the creatures are glorifying to their Artificer."'31 Again, Passmore 
claims that "Augustinian Christianity neither laid the task sc. of com- 
pleting God's creation on man's shoulders nor promised him God's 
help if he should undertake it," and believes that the Genesis myth 
suggests that the Universe is completed simply by man's living the- 
rein.32 But Augustine held that man participates in God's work 
through the arts and the sciences, agriculture among them; a teaching 
put into practice, as Glacken says, by Benedict.33 Thus, though 
Augustine sometimes expressed a despotic attitude to fellow- 
creatures, his position, seen in the round, does not reflect "Stoic- 
Christian arrogance," and is largely of a piece with the ideas of Basil 
and Ambrose on the perfecting of creation. (There was, indeed, a 
Stoic precedent for this view of mankind's role in the teaching of 
Posidonius;34 but it should be stressed that despite lapses Augustine 
rejected Stoic anthropocentrism and accepted the intrinsic value of 
nonhuman creatures.) 
In actual medieval practice saintliness was associated with kind- 
ness to animals in the West as well as in the East.35 Nor could a merely 
instrumental view of animals have been fostered by the various bene- 
dictions on stables and sick domestic animals, or the Benedictio 
Deprecatoria on pests, which C. W. Hume has collected from the 
medieval Roman liturgy.36 Passmore relates (108) that hermits lived in 
the wildnerness because it was the last foe to be conquered; yet 
monasteries in wild places, as Glacken remarks (302-04), were also 
seen as restoring paradise. In particular, the monasteries of the Bene- 
dictine rule encouraged work aimed at enhancing the beauty and 
fruitfulness of the landscape.37 Nor was it assumed that human action 
could not damage the environment. In this matter G. P. Marsh's 
warnings38 were anticipated not only by John Evelyn (see next 
section) but also by Albertus Magnus;39 indeed Glacken closely docu- 
ments regulations aimed at conservation in the Alpine valleys and 
elsewhere in this period (342, and 313-46 passim). Indeed, active 
measures, like building dikes and digging ditches, were recognized as 
31 The City of God, XII.4, cited by Glacken, 198f. 32 MR, 33, 212; AN, 258. 
33 Glacken, 200, 304-06. 
34 MR, 33. 
35Glacken, 309-11. 
36C.W. Hume, The Status of Animals in the Christian Religion (London, 1957), 
94-98. 
37Glacken, 302-04; Robert Nisbet, The Social Philosophers (London, 1974), 
326-38, esp. 327 and 334. 38 MR, 23. 
39Glacken, 315. 
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vital for preserving the land. The warnings and the regulations would, 
of course, have been unnecessary if deforestation was not at times 
excessive, something which the very success of monastic agriculture 
seems to have promoted; yet the existence of conflicts over forestry 
shows that not everyone's attitude was oriented towards maximizing 
short-term profits without thought for considerations such as natural 
beauty or generations to come. 
As to the attitudes of medieval divines, the period is, as Glacken 
relates, too complex to be described in bold strokes (253). Thus Bona- 
ventura and others regarded nature as a system of symbols (237f.), but 
Albert the Great and others studied it for its own interest as well as 
for its usefulness (227-29). Peter Lombard, as also later John Calvin, 
held that everything was made for man;40 but John the Scot saw the 
whole of nature as "a movement powered by love of God.' 41 Francis, 
according to Bonaventura, held views similar to those of Chrysostom 
about the appropriateness of gentleness towards animals and about 
the common origins of man and beast,42 but Aquinas held cruelty to 
animals to be wrong only because of its bad effects on the agent's 
character and the owner's property.43 He did also claim, however, 
that Paul's remark about oxen means only that God does not care 
about them as rational creatures, not that they are excluded from his 
providence.44 He also recognized the comeliness which God's adorn- 
ment of the world with plants added to its original shapeless condition, 
and understood mankind's proper work as including the further 
adornment of the created earth.45 Passmore is probably right to imply 
that Aquinas' views have encouraged insensitivity towards animals. 
But his belief that it is part of man's perfection to impart perfection to 
other creatures after their kind46 coheres well with the longstanding 
tradition of Posidonius, Basil, and Ambrose. Indeed overall "Greco- 
Christian arrogance" is an unsuitable characterization of the patristic 
and medieval attitudes to nature, which often, though falteringly, 
approximated to that of active stewardship approved (but not found in 
this period) by Passmore.47 
40AN, 253, MR, 13. 
41Glacken, 212. 
42 Otto Karrer (ed.), St. Francis of Assisi, The Legends and the Lauds, translated 
by N. Wydenbruck (London, 1947), 161, cited by Andrew Linzey, Animal Rights: A 
Christian Assessment of Man's Treatment of Animals (London, 1976), 103, n. 22. 
43 TA, 201. 
44 Summa Theologiae, 1, q. 103, a5, ad2. As Rodman points out (3 and n. 3, p. 20) 
Aquinas also incorporated verbatim Ulpian's definition of ius naturae, and ex- 
pounded it in terms of the instinct for self-preservation common to men and animals 
(Summa Theologiae, I, q. 94, a2). 
45Glacken, 234, nn. 196 and 198. 
46Summa Theologiae, I, q. 103 a6; also ibid., ad2. 
47MR, 185. 
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IV. Though Calvin held that everything in creation was made for 
human beings, this was denied by Descartes,48 and solemn reminders 
of its falsity were issued in the same century by Henry More and John 
Ray, in the next century by Linnaeus, and in the nineteenth century 
by William Paley.49 Indeed Calvin combined his anthropocentrism 
with a belief in stewardship over the whole earth, not just, as Pass- 
more claims, over the reprobate (29). Thus he writes: "Man was 
created in this condition, that the earth was subject to him; but he 
enjoys it only when he understands that it has been leased to him by 
the Lord .... Now if I want to plunder the earth of what God has 
given it for the nourishment of men, . . . I want to bring to nothing the 
goodness of God... ." 50 and his teaching was "Let every one regard 
himself as the steward of God in all things which he possesses."51 
Here the biblical belief in stewardship and responsible dominion is 
re-emphasized well before its expression, according to Passmore, for 
the first time among Christians by Sir Matthew Hale in 1677. 
In a deservedly famous passage, Hale wrote that man was created 
as God's viceroy, steward, and bailiff and was given dominion to curb 
the fiercer animals, protect the tame and useful ones, to preserve and 
improve plant species, to check unprofitable vegetable growth, and 
"to preserve the face of the Earth in beauty, usefulness and fruitful- 
ness." 52 Passmore regards Hale's acceptance of this latter duty as not 
typically Christian, but it was in fact in direct continuity with the 
views of Basil, Ambrose, and Theodoret. (Indeed, Passmore's view 
that the activist attitudes of Hale-and also of Bacon-were Pelagian 
and out of keeping with Augustinian Christianity (30f., 19) would seem 
to imply that Augustine himself, with his praise of human art and 
industry, as attested above, was a Pelagian!) It should be remarked, 
however, that Hale held that all creatures, whether high or low in the 
natural order, are adapted to one another's needs and convenience, 
and not only to those of mankind.53 
With Francis Bacon and Rene Descartes we certainly encounter a 
more activist and somewhat more ruthless approach, and to these 
pioneers of modern science Passmore attributes the beginnings of an 
uncompromising application of the attitude that man is at liberty to 
48 MR, 20. 
49Glacken, 424; cf. MR, 21f. 
50 Cited by Andre Bieler, La pensee economique et sociale de Calvin (Geneva, 
1959, 432-35), and translated by Derr at Ecology and Human Liberation, 20. 
51 Commentary on Genesis 2:15; quoted from a translation of 1847 by Welbourn 
at "Man's Dominion," 563. 
52 Sir Matthew Hale, The Primitive Origination of Mankind (London, 1677), cited 
by Glacken at 481, by John Black, The Dominion of Man: The Search for Ecological 
Responsibility (Edinburgh, 1970), 56f, and by Passmore at MR, 30. 
53 Glacken, 400. 
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modify nature as he will (17). Bacon certainly hoped that the applica- 
tion of science would lead to the restoration of man's dominion, and 
in the New Atlantis he cherished the aim of "the enlarging of the 
bounds of the Human Empire, to the effecting of all things possi- 
ble." 54 He also (like Descartes) supported vivisection for the sake of 
medical research.55 Yet his words must be read against his admonition 
about the ends of knowledge, which is not to be sought for pleasure, 
profit, fame, or power, "but for the benefit and use of life, and that 
they perfect and govern it in charity. For ... of charity there can be 
no excess." 56 Neither these words nor his commendation of rever- 
ence before nature57 are the sentiments of a man who believes that 
there are no moral constraints on human transactions with nature. 
Descartes is often held, as by Passmore,58 to have supposed that 
nonhuman animals lacked feelings altogether. That, unlike his fol- 
lower Malebranche, Descartes did not believe this had been con- 
vincingly argued by John Cottingham;59 but their supposed lack of 
thought in such animals was held by Descartes to justify killing and 
eating them.60 His aim that we should "render ourselves the masters 
and possessors of nature"6' certainly has a despotic tone; yet he was 
no advocate of irresponsible ruthlessness. Thus Descartes held that it 
was right to forego benefits for the living for the sake of the long-term 
advantage of posterity,62 one of the central emphases of moder envi- 
ronmental ethics; and he would have opposed short-term gains which 
threatened human health, one of his main preoccupations. He also 
stressed the requirement for humility to reflect on our faults and the 
infirmity of our nature,63 in a way lacking in many of his followers. 
In 1662 the Royal Society was instituted in England to pursue 
science by Baconian methods. Its members regarded this pursuit as a 
means of glorifying God and discovering evidence of His handiwork. 
One of the first works of its members was John Evelyn's Silva, or A 
Discourse on Forest Trees; in it, as also in the official French Forest 
Ordinance of 1669, the dangers of excessive deforestation are 
54Francis Bacon, The Advancement ofLearning and the New Atlantis, ed. Arthur 
Johnston (Oxford, 1974), 239. 55 Ibid., 241 (from New Atlantis). 
56 Francis Bacon, The New Organon, ed. Fulton H. Anderson (Indianapolis and 
New York, 1960), 15f (from The Great Instauration). 57 Ibid., 16. 58 TA, 204. 
59 John Cottingham, "'A Brute to the Brutes?' Descartes' Treatment of 
Animals," Philosophy, 53 (1978), 551-59. 
60 Tom Regan and Peter Singer (eds.), Animal Rights and Human Obligations 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.Y., 1976), 66. 
61 Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method, Part VI, from The Philosophical Works 
of Descartes, trans. by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. T. R. Ross, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 
1967), I, 119. 
62 Haldane and Ross, I, 122; from Discourse, Part VI. 
63 Haldane and Ross, I, 402: from The Passions of the Soul, Art. CLV. 
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stressed, and Evelyn urges the need to understand and preserve the 
forests both in the national interest and for the sake of natural beauty. 
A similar and perhaps more striking expression of his concern to avoid 
the adverse side effects of human action is found in his Fumifugium, 
a discourse on atmospheric pollution in cities such as London.6 In 
many ways Evelyn anticipated George P. Marsh's theme in Man and 
Nature (published in 1864) of the despoliation of nature by mankind. 
Thus the earliest adherents of modem science were far from believing 
that people could treat nature as they pleased. (Evelyn's theme was 
taken up in the eighteenth century by another theistic believer, 
J. G. Herder, who recognized that the land in North America had 
deteriorated as a result of human activity.)65 
Passmore is, I believe, correct to interpret George Herbert as 
holding that nature is man's servant.66 But this was not the only 
attitude of all British poets of the seventeenth century. Thus the 
Welsh poet Henry Vaughan believed in the resurrection of all living 
creatures: 
O knowing, glorious spirit! when 
Thou shalt restore trees, beasts and men, 
When thou shalt make all new again 
Destroying onely death and pain, 
Give him amongst thy works a place 
Who in them lov'd and sought thy face! 
while another of his poems bears as its title Rom. Cap. 8 ver. 19, and 
as its subtitle the Vulgate rendering of that verse, Etenim res Creatae 
exerto Capite observantes expectant revelationem Filiorum Dei.67 
These poems make it clear that Paul's reflective views on the non- 
human creation were not altogether neglected among Christians until 
recent times. 
Nor was consideration for animals restricted to those influenced 
by the Talmud such as the Leibnizian philosopher, A. G. Baum- 
garten.68 Kant relates that Leibniz, after using a tiny worm for scien- 
tific observation "carefully replaced it with its leaf on the tree so that 
it should not come to harm through any act of his."69 Leibniz was a 
Christian who believed that all created substances, whether high or 
64 Glacken, 485-94. 
65 Glacken, 540f. 
66 MR, 31. 
67 S.L. Bethell, The Cultural Revolution of the Seventeenth Century (London, 
1949), 160, 157. 
68 MR, 124; AN, 255; TA, 201f. 
69 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. by Louis Infield (New York, 1963), 
239-41, reprinted in Regan and Singer, 122f. 
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low in the chain of being, had a perfection of their own to attain. (As 
to Kant himself, Passmore is correct that he denied duties to 
animals,70 but gives a misleading impression by quoting without 
further qualification Kant's remark that ".. .supposing we regard 
nature as a teleological system, he (man) is born to be its ultimate 
end."71 For in his third Critique Kant emphatically rejected the belief 
that man is the end of creation, denying at the same time that nature 
is a teleological system.72) Passmore is correct in detecting a dramatic 
change to more humane attitudes to the treatment of nonhuman 
animals in the last two hundred years, and in tracing the origins of this 
rapid transition to utilitarians such as Hume and Bentham and to the 
Evangelicals. But the traditions of Christendom were less uniformly 
inhospitable to this change than Passmore represents them as being; 
indeed this shift in attitudes is the more intelligible if there existed 
some of the "seeds" of it within those traditions. Thus belief in the 
naturalness and rightness of compassion for animal suffering is found 
in William Wollaston and among the New England clergy.73 Further, 
if, as Macaulay held, the Puritans hated bear-baiting because of the 
spectators' pleasure in it,74 could they have altogether lacked, he also 
implies, sympathy for bears? 
Coleman finds that seventeenth-century Christian apologetics en- 
dorsed capitalist enterprise and abandoned traditional Christian ob- 
jections to the exploitation of man and nature. Of the three apologists 
cited (John Ray, William Derham, and Nehemiah Grew) only Ray 
wrote the relevant work in that century. All these writers traced the 
hand of providence in the wonders of science and the activity of man; 
and doubtless too much "Industry of Man" was eventually justified 
by these means in some quarters. Yet there is nothing exploitative 
about the passage which Coleman quotes from Ray; indeed, the tone 
is little different from that of Basil, who, as will be seen, had used 
many of the same phrases and the same scriptural quotation: "I per- 
suade myself, that the bountiful and gracious Author of Man's Being 
and Faculties, and all Things else, delights in the Beauty of his Crea- 
tion, and is well pleased with the Industry of Man, in adorning the 
Earth with beautiful Cities and Castles; with pleasant Villages and 
Country-Houses; with regular Gardens and Orchards, and Plantations 
of all Sorts of Shrubs, and Herbs, and Fruits, for Meat, Medicine, or 
moderate Delight; with shady Woods and Groves, and Walks set with 
Rows of elegant Trees; with Pastures cloathed with Flocks, and Val- 
leys covered with Corn, and Meadows burthened with Grass, what- 
70 TA, 202. 71 MR, 15. 72 Glacken, 540f. 
73 See Norman S. Fiering, "Irresistible Compassion: An Aspect of Eighteenth 
Century Sympathy and Humanitarianism," JHI, 37 (1976), 195-218; 204f. Passmore 
himself mentions Wollaston in a related connection of TA, 207. 74 TA, 195. 
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ever else differenceth a civil and well-cultivated Region, from a barren 
and desolate Wilderness."75 Granted also Ray's rejection of the view 
that everything was made for humans, Ray's posture cannot be re- 
garded even as the foreshadowing of an exploitative attitude. How far, 
though, was such an attitude manifested in the next century? 
Derham's writings were, as Coleman remarks, even more popular 
than Ray's; and they certainly include the endorsement as providen- 
tial of a great diversity of human predispositions, including those to 
"Mechanics, Architecture, War, Navigation, Commerce and Agricul- 
ture."76 Elsewhere Derham applied the language of stewardship to 
God's requirement for diligence in one's calling, whether as priest, 
"Gentleman, Tradesman, Mechanick or only Servant."77 Human 
ingenuity in the various walks of life is providential because it guaran- 
tees that no opportunity will be neglected which could satisfy the 
"Necessities and Occasions of the World" and of civilization.78 
Coleman rightly criticizes Derham for placing all the various "call- 
ings," including war and commerce, on the same moral footing. "Der- 
ham", he proceeds to remark (33), "clearly portrays the ultimate 
adaptation of English church doctrine to the urgent needs of those 
who held economic expansion to be society's preferred objective." 
Indeed, at one point (35) he represents Derham as accepting here "a 
divine command to steel ourselves for a ruthless assault upon 
nature." 
This assessment seems less than fair. Some of the time Derham 
simply reaffirmed (as George Herbert also had) the Pauline theme that 
talents should not be wasted and that mundane tasks should be per- 
formed as if for God. He sometimes wrote in a manner insufficiently 
critical of the new capitalism of his day; but we can hardly take him 
on the strength of this lapse to be favoring the deforestation and 
pollution of the planet, rather than the achievement of the kind of 
landscape praised by his friend Ray. Indeed, Derham's time and writ- 
ings, to judge by papers cited by Coleman and by Glacken's account,79 
were occupied with neither social advocacy nor the defense of com- 
merce but with amassing the painstaking detail of a cumulative design 
argument and with biological and astronomical observations con- 
ducted partly for the sake of this project and partly for their own sake. 
75 John Ray, The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation, 11th ed. 
(London, 1743), 164f., cited by Coleman, 31. Glacken, 484, cites the same passage. 
76 William Derham, Physico-Theology: or, A demonstration of the being and 
attributes of God, from his works of creation, 10th ed. (London, 1742), 263, cited by 
Coleman, 33. 77 Coleman, 35f. 78 Coleman, 33-35. 
79 A.D. Atkinson, "William Derham, F.R.S.," Annals of Science, 8 (1952), 368- 
92; J.J. Dahm, "Science and Apologetics in the early Boyle Lectures," Church 
History, 39 (1970), 172-86; Glacken, 421-25. 
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It also seems to have been for this teleological reasoning that Derham 
was read and remembered, and not for his subsidiary theme of the 
providential nature of human enterprise. 
Nor does Coleman establish that Christianity in England aban- 
doned its previous strictures on greed and self-aggrandizement and 
began to give unqualified backing to capitalist expansion. The overall 
picture is a complex one which cannot adequately be investigated 
here; but it is to be doubted if either Swift or Pope endorsed the 
attitudes ascribed by Coleman to Derham. Nehemiah Grew, botanist, 
theologian, and author of The meanes of a most ample increase of the 
wealth and strength of England in a few years (circa 1707)80 con- 
stitutes evidence in favor of Coleman's case; so too, perhaps, may 
John Locke's second Treatise of Civil Government with its defense of 
enclosures and property, though with Locke there were qualifications 
which would, if applied now, as Gregory Kavka has argued,81 
severely curtail economic growth. There again, some Christians who 
turned to trade, such as the eighteenth-century Quaker ironmasters, 
continued to observe constraints on the pursuit of profit, insisting on 
honesty in business dealings, foregoing the profit to be had from 
Sunday working, and showing concern for the working conditions of 
employees.82 Christians did not in general, then, embark on a relent- 
less assault upon nature; and if, as Coleman holds, "the principal 
contribution of Christian doctrine to our environmental crisis was the 
creation and application of a new apologetic..." as put forward by 
Derham, then the empirical evidence which would be required to 
attest White's thesis as applied to the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries is still wanting. 
V. Christian attitudes to nature have not typically been exploita- 
tive, pace White, Passmore, and Coleman. Positions held by Chris- 
tians on the treatment of animals have, I should acknowledge, often 
been open to severe moral censure, and to some extent still remain so. 
(Meanwhile the conditions in which many animals are now being 
reared for food are nothing short of appalling; there is thus probably 
more maltreatment of animals for Christians and others to protest 
against now than ever before.) But efforts to establish a link between 
Christian ethics and our worldwide environmental problems have 
been inconclusive. If attitudes have contributed significantly to these 
80 Cited by Coleman at 35, n. 16. 
81 Gregory Kavka, "The Futurity Problem", in R.I. Sikora and Brian Barry, 
Obligations to Future Generations (Philadelphia, 1978), 180-203; 200f. 
82 See Noel Coley's case study "Quaker Contributions to Eighteenth-century 
science and technology," in Scientific Progress and Religious Dissent, Block 3 of the 
Open University's course "Science and Belief: Copernicus to Darwin," Milton 
Keynes, 1974, 79-92. 
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problems at all, it is at least as cogent to cite belief in the inevitability 
of progress, especially where progress is construed as involving in- 
creasing consumption. This attitude is more easily correlated with, 
e.g., the geographical spread of industrial pollution, than with belief 
in man's God-given dominion or stewardship. 
Lynn White seems hostile to any active approach to nature, even 
to the investigative activity of science, which he rightly finds Western 
Christianity to have eventually fostered. Passmore, by contrast, ac- 
cepts that science and technology are of value, that people should take 
account of the side effects of their actions disclosed by science, and 
that they should not abandon technological activity in exercizing re- 
sponsible dominion over nature, preserving both the earth and human 
civilization. But, like White, he is wrong to hold that Christians have 
usually held that people may treat nature as they please. Christians 
can accept that the survival of humanity is not supernaturally guaran- 
teed, and indeed have the resources in their tradition to accept more 
far-reaching obligations with respect to future people and fellow- 
creatures than Passmore now accepts. None of this requires abandon- 
ment of the Judaeo-Christian belief in God's good purposes. 
Belief in man's stewardship is far more ancient and has been far 
more constant among Christians than Passmore allows; and, though 
Coleman exaggerates Derham's position, he is correct in noticing that 
this belief can have far-reaching implications. Thus secular versions 
of the position that one's energy, talents and possessions are held in 
trust and are to be deployed responsibly occur frequently among 
contemporary writers seeking an ethic suited to environmental ques- 
tions, and not least in the writings of Passmore.8 I am not, however, 
claiming that all Christians have held any one view of nature; too 
diverse, as Glacken says, are the positions which Christians have 
held. History bears out his claim that one must grant "the contradic- 
tions and difficulties in exploring that intractable subject, the Chris- 
tian view of nature, once one has advanced beyond the first easy 
assertions." Yet not even the first easy assertions should find a des- 
potic attitude to nature typical of Christians. The biblical position, 
which makes people responsible to God for the uses to which the 
natural environment is put, has never been entirely lost to view, and 
may properly be appealed to by the very people who rightly criticize 
the exploitative attitudes which prevail in many places throughout the 
contemporary world.84 
University College Cardiff, Wales 
83 MR, 185. 
84 These matters are more amply discussed in Robin Attfield, The Ethics of Envi- 
ronmental Concern (Oxford and New York, 1983). 
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